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Abstract
Electoral turnout is shown to be higher and less socially skewed in member states of the
enlarged European Union than in the United States. The differences in the levels of turnout
can partly be related to differences in election procedures, but since the procedural rules
provide similar incentives or disincentives to all social groups they cannot explain the
much higher inequality of electoral participation in America. There is some evidence to
sustain the notion that the higher inclusiveness of the West European welfare state fosters
political integration and the equality of electoral participation. In line with this notion
differences between Europe and America diminish considerably when the analysis is
confined to the pensioner generation whose integration into welfare state schemes is
largely similar on both sides of the Atlantic.
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1 Contrasting images of political participation in
Europe and America: The ideas of a European
social model and of American exceptionalism
The Eastern enlargement of the European Union raised the issue to what extent the new
member states would follow in the policy footsteps of the old member states rather than
taking the United States as their role model. Drawing a polemical distinction between “old”
and “new Europe”, a former US secretary of defense suggested that the Central and Eastern
European countries might adhere more closely to the United States as the super power that
helped ending their dependence upon the Soviet Empire. This chapter will examine to what
extent patterns of political participation differ between the United States and Europe and
where exactly the new member states fit in this comparison.
In a comparative perspective voter turnout in the United States is notoriously low. Why
so many citizens of the oldest democracy in the modern world choose to disenfranchise
themselves voluntarily is a question that has puzzled sociologists and political scientists
for decades. From a rational choice perspective, going to the polls may appear as irrational
behavior, because a single vote counts very little and may not be worth the effort of casting
a ballot. But why then do the citizens of European democracies participate so much more
frequently – and, as we shall see, so much more equally – in elections? Such questions have
occupied a central place in comparative political science research upon which we build
here with some new comparative data that focus on the degree of inequality of political
participation in old and new member states of the European Union as well as in the United
States.
Basically, there are two interpretations of the discrepant voting behavior in Europe and
America, both of which have normative connotations. From one perspective, which we
might call the theory of “American exceptionalism” as first developed by Seymour Martin
Lipset (Lipset 1969; Lipset 1996; Lipset and Marks 2000), non-voting is interpreted as not
only rational, but also reasonable behavior which is rooted in certain peculiar features of
the American political system and of American society which distinguish the United States
from Europe.1 The other perspective, which we might label the idea of a “European social
model” sees the higher turnout in Europe as a result of a higher degree of political
integration of the masses which is linked to a more inclusive character of the European
state. The “American exceptionalism” school of thought stresses above all the peculiar
characteristics of the American political institutions, but also points out features of
American society which promote non-voting.2 From this perspective, non-voting is typical
in a social setting which is marked by the following features:
PAGE 4
THE INEQUALITY OF ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION IN EUROPE AND AMERICA
- a high level of well-being and basic satisfaction with the way things are going so
that people have more interesting things to do than indulge in politics (Lipset
1969: 217);
- many cross-pressures - which are typical for an open society with low class
barriers, intersecting group affiliations and high rates of social mobility -
complicating choice and dampening political emotions (Lipset 1969: 203, 206,
209);
- an active civil society with ample chances for voluntary action which provide
alternative forms of political participation to voting, thus diversifying the
channels and chances of political action (Lipset 1969: 67; Lipset 1996: 26).
Primarily, however, the “American exceptionalism” perspective links low turnout to
specific features of the American political system, above all to peculiarities of the
American electoral system which result in a number of disincentives for voting. From this
perspective the most important institutional impediments to voting are :
- voting is burdensome requiring a specific act of previous registration (Lipset
1996: 45);
- elections are held on weekdays so that people must get off work in order to vote
(Lipset 1996: 45);
- there is a plethora of political offices to be filled by elections, which means that
there are many diverse channels of political participation that diminish the desire
to participate in any one particular way and get voters tired of the recurrent acts of
voting (Lipset 1996: 43);
- the federal system of decision making and the divided form of American
government disperse political responsibilities thus making each single act of
voting much less relevant than in more centralized political systems (Lipset 1996:
39, 40);
- politics are less relevant to citizens because the scope of state action is more
limited, so that crucial decisions structuring people’s life chance are basically
made in the market sphere (or at least outside the scope of state responsibilities),
thus rendering the results of elections comparatively irrelevant (Lipset 1969: 186;
Lipset 1996: 27).3
There is little reason to assume that the American impediments to voting – which all
increase the cost of voting relative to the expected benefits - impinge very differently on
specific social classes. As Lipset himself observed, “the more cohesive and stable a
democratic system is, the more likely it becomes that all segments of the population will
react in the same direction to major stimuli” (Lipset 1969: 33).
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Lipset refers to two additional features fostering political integration, which are also
highlighted by proponents of the “European social model”.4 First he notes that electoral
turnout reflects the scope of state action or, as he calls it, the degree of “statism” which
influences the relevance of government policies (Lipset 1969: 186; 1996: 27). Secondly,
he notes that “the combination of a low vote and a relative lack of organization among the
lower-status groups means that they will suffer from neglect by the politicians who will
be receptive to the wishes of the more privileged, participating, and organized strata”
(Lipset 1969: 216-17). This idea very much resembles the notion of a vicious circle which
Piven and Cloward (1988) developed to denote the American political process: The more
socially skewed political participation is, and the less lower income groups go to the polls,
the less incentive there is for politicians to design policies which consider the concerns
of lower classes; and the more policies are geared to the articulated interests of the better-
off, the more the lower classes become politically alienated and turn away from the
political process.5
The positive mirror image of this negative scenario is what a political system should
look like from the perspective of the European social model: On the input side, all citizens
participate (more or less) equally, and political office is not only for the rich who can afford
the cost of electoral campaigns, but open for everyone, because the costs of elections are
partly borne to a large extent by the public purse which distributes public subsidies among
the competing parties according to the number of votes they could mobilize. This results
in a more representative structure of parliament which reflects the social structure of
society without very strong distortions.6 On the output side, universal welfare state
schemes incorporate the entire population into schemes which provide social rights to all
citizens at a level generous enough to avoid that the middle and upper classes opt out to
private solutions. Hence, public welfare is neither fragmented into many categorical
schemes - which segment political loyalties - nor bifurcated into special targeted schemes
for a stigmatized poor part of the population on the one side and more generous schemes
for the middle classes on the other. In the European social model public welfare schemes
have a dual politically inclusive effect: (1) They foster the political integration of all
citizens regardless of income or status, because all citizens have not only the same voting
rights but also universal social rights attached to citizenship. (2) Supplementing the market
with a second arena for the distribution of life chances, the state not only ameliorates social
inequalities in the market sphere, but also gives all citizens – rather than only the rich who
are affected by tax cuts or by public investment decisions – an important stake in political
decisions thus increasing the salience of politics for everyone. This makes not only for
higher levels of political turnout, but also for a fairly equal distribution of turnout across
all social strata.
It is impossible here to subject all these propositions similarly to an empirical test.
Based on some new comparative data, we can, however, pursue a set of relevant descriptive
and analytical issues. On descriptive grounds we can investigate the following aspects:
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- How high is voter turnout in Europe and America, and where do the new member
states stand in this respect?
- Is turnout less socially skewed in Europe and how do old and new member states
compare to America?
On analytical grounds we will probe the following questions:
- To what extent can cross-national differences in turnout be explained by the
institutional rules of the electoral game?
- To what extent do we find social inequalities of political participation which
contradict the idea that institutional impediments impinge similarly on all social
groups?
- To what extent can cross-national differences in patterns of turnout be related to
the inclusiveness of the state, and do differences vanish once the impact of
welfare state programs is held constant?
- Is non-voting an indication of political satisfaction and to what extent are its
effects counter-acted by other forms of political participation?
2 Levels of electoral participation in Europe and
America
Following U.S. official statistics, only one in two Americans bothers to vote in U.S.
presidential elections. Even though representing the highest level since 1968, the official
turnout of the last presidential election on November 7th 2004 just stood at 56.7 per cent
(Federal Election Commission 2005a: 5). A proper understanding of these figures,
however, requires a certain familiarity with the intricacies of American electoral statistics.7
Generally, one expects the turnout rate to equal the number of votes cast divided by the
eligible electorate. However, the size of the eligible electorate in the United States is
difficult to estimate. Using the size of the population at voting age as denominator, the
turnout rates officially reported by the Federal Election Commission considerably under-
report turnout, because the voting age population includes resident aliens who do not have
the right to vote.
For a proper comparison of American and European turnout rates it is necessary to use
turnout rates that are similarly defined. The United States Election project (http://
elections.gmu.edu/; McDonald and Popkin 2001) provides an accurate estimate of the
turnout rates based on the voting eligible population (VEP), which is defined as the
population at voting-age that actually holds the rights of citizenship. In Figure 1 we
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compare the average turnout during the last three American presidential elections
according to this rectified procedure - 56 per cent - with the average turnout rates in the
last three national elections of European countries. The European data are provided by the
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA; http://www.idea.int/
index.cfm).8 The comparison of the American and European figures is based on the
Figure 1: Voter turnout in the last three national elections (averages)
Source: http://www.idea.int/vt/; USA: McDonald/Popkin 2001 and http://elections.gmu.edu/
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assumption that the electoral registers of European countries provide complete lists of the
voting eligible population.9 This seems justified for electoral systems where administrations
are responsible for maintaining continuously updated lists of voters, or where registration
is compulsory. To the best of our knowledge, this is the case in all European countries
except Ireland and Malta.
In Figure 1 we have divided the European countries into three groups. The first group
consists of the 15 traditional EU member states, to which we here refer as EU-15, “Western
Europe” or “old member states”. A second group is formed by the new member states of
the European Union which had come under communist rule after World War II but joined
the Union in 2003 or 2007. These countries will be called “post-communist new member
states” or “transformation countries”. Finally there is a group of two further countries –
Malta and Cyprus - which belong neither to the old EU nor to the transformation countries
and which we grouped together as “Mediterranean periphery countries”. To facilitate
comparisons between the three European country groups and the U.S., we have calculated
group means10, which are plotted as vertical lines in the graphs.
The overriding finding illustrated in Figure 1 is that American turnout is low by Western
European standards, and that the post-communist new member states are more similar to
the United States than to Western Europe. The American turnout of 56 per cent compares
to an average turnout of 78 per cent in Western European countries, and to an average of
64 per cent in the transformation countries. Not a single Western European country has
turnout rates below the American level, and the United Kingdom11, Portugal and Ireland
are the only countries to approximate the low American figure. In the case of the post-
communist new member states the averages based on the three last elections conceal that
fact that turnout has recently been shrinking. Averaging 71 per cent in the first election
after the transformation which we covered here, turnout has declined to 59 per cent in the
most recent one, thus being only slightly above the American level.
The question then is how we can explain these differences. Do they reflect differences
in the inclusiveness of the state, as proponents of the European social model would suggest,
or are they merely the result of different election procedures resulting in voter fatigue, as
theorists of “American exceptionalism” would have it? In order to capture the impact of
different election systems, we have compiled some key characteristics of the institutional
setting in which elections are embedded (Table 1). The table lists for each election for
which we present comparative turnout data the timing of the event - weekend or work-
day -, the branch of government which was elected - legislative (parliamentary) or exec-
utive (presidential) -, whether voting was compulsory or not, whether registration for
voting was an administrative act or required a special individual effort, the type of electoral
system which prevailed in each country, the degree of competitiveness of the election, and
how many parties held more than 5 per cent of the seats in the national parliament.12 What
follows is a brief discussion of the likely impact which each of these factors exerts on
turnout.
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Holding elections on a weekend rather than on a workday is frequently assumed to reduce
the costs of participation, thus leading to higher turnout rates in countries with weekend
elections (Lijphart 1997; Oppenhuis 1995; Franklin 2004).13 Table 1 shows that only four
European countries follow the example of the United States in scheduling elections on
workdays (United Kingdom, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Denmark).14 Average turnout
Table 1: Institutional characteristics of elections
 
 Average 
turnout 
Election 
on 
weekend 
Electoral 
branch 
Com-
pulsory 
voting 
Bureau-
cratic 
registrati-
on 
Electoral 
system 
 Compe-
titiveness 
No. of 
parties 
US (96/00/04) 56 No Exec. No No FPTP 3 2 
         
PT (99/02/05) 63 Yes Leg. No Yes List PR 10 4 
GB (97/01/05) 64 No Leg. No Yes FPTP 8 3 
IE (92/97/02) 66 No Leg. No No STV 15 3 
ES (96/00/04) 74 Yes Leg. No Yes List PR 6 2 
FI (94/00/06) 76 Yes Exec. No Yes List PR 5 5 
GR (96/00/04) 76 Yes Leg. Yes Yes List PR 3 2 
NL (98/02/03) 77 No Leg. No Yes List PR 6 6 
DE (98/02/05) 80 Yes Leg. No Yes MMP 3 4 
AT (99/02/06) 81 Yes Leg. No Yes List PR 4 4 
FR (88/95/02) 81 Yes Exec. No Yes TRS 26 3 
IT (96/01/06) 83 Yes Leg. Yes Yes List PR 2 5 
SE (94/98/02) 83 Yes Leg. No Yes List PR 20 6 
DK (98/01/05) 86 No Leg. No Yes List PR 6 6 
LU (94/99/04) 89 Yes Leg. Yes Yes List PR 11 5 
BE (95/99/03) 93 Yes Leg. Yes Yes List PR 2 10 
EU-15 78      8 5 
         
CY (93/98/03) 92 Yes Exec. Yes Yes List PR 5 4 
MT (96/98/03) 96 Yes Leg. No No STV 4 2 
Med. Periph 94      5 3 
         
LT (98/03/04) 60 Yes Exec. No Yes Parallel 5 4 
PL (95/00/05) 60 Yes Exec. No Yes List PR 16 6 
BG (97/01/05) 60 Yes Leg. No Yes List PR 22 4 
EE (95/99/03) 61 Yes Leg. No Yes List PR 8 6 
RO (96/00/04) 62 Yes Exec. No Yes List PR 15 5 
HU (98/02/06) 65 Yes Leg. No Yes MMP 2 2 
CZ (98/02/06) 65 Yes Leg. No Yes List PR 4 4 
SI (96/00/04) 68 Yes Leg. No Yes List PR 15 5 
SK (98/02/06) 70 Yes Leg. No Yes List PR 5 7 
LV (95/98/02) 72 Yes Leg. No - List PR 3 6 
NMS 10 64      10 5 
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in these four countries amounted to 73 per cent which is 17 percentage points higher than
the American rate. This suggests that the scheduling of elections alone cannot account for
the American turnout gap.
National elections also differ according to the branch of government for which the
voters cast their ballot. We here aimed at elections for the legislative branch of the
democracy, i.e. at elections to the national parliament. Some countries, however, also elect
the executive branch (i.e. the president) directly, and we consider presidential elections
as a “first order election” whenever the President has not merely representative functions
but also plays an important role in forming the government or in exercising executive
power. This is the case not only in the United States, but also in Finland, France, Lithuania,
Poland, and Romania.15 The three transformation countries with executive elections have
lower turnout rates than the other post-communist countries (61% vs. 66%), whereas the
two Western European countries with presidential elections do not differ sizably from
other EU-15 countries (79% vs. 78%). Hence, the American turnout remains low from a
European perspective even if we compare the United States only to Western European
countries with executive elections.
Compulsory voting effectively boosts electoral participation even in countries where
non-compliance does not result in specific punishments. Greece, Italy, Luxembourg,
Belgium, and Cyprus all have compulsory voting.16 Average turnout in the four Western
European countries with compulsory voting amounted to 85 per cent, compared to 76 per
cent in the other old member states. Even if we abstract from countries with compulsory
voting, the remaining Western European countries thus have much higher turnout than the
United States.
The methods of voter registration have an impact on turnout because countries differ
with respect to the institutional hurdles they put in front of the citizens. Whereas some
countries hold individual citizens responsible to register for elections, so that the initiative
rests with the individual, others make public administrations responsible for maintaining
lists of eligible voters and for contacting them prior to the election. The more individual
initiative is required for registration, the higher is the hurdle or the effort it takes to
participate. Comparative data on this crucial difference are rather difficult to obtain. The
best respective source to our knowledge is the expert survey of the “ACE Electoral
Knowledge Network” (http://aceproject.org/). Even this source cannot give a clear
indication of the cost it takes the voter to get registered in practice. It does, however,
provide information as to whether registration lists are obligatory or not. Assuming that
countries which do not have obligatory registration put higher responsibilities on
individual voters, we take this as a rough proxy for the individual effort required to register.
Ireland is the only EU-15 country that resembles the United States in not having
compulsory registration and it also stands out for its low electoral turnout.17 This suggests
that differences in registration procedures may indeed account for some of observed
national differences in electoral participation.
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With respect to electoral procedures, it is often argued that due to the “winner take all”
principle many votes are wasted in countries with majority vote. From this perspective,
turnout should be higher in proportional systems than in majority systems (Oppenhuis
1995; Powell 1986). Table 1 lists which of the two basic types prevails in each country and
also gives a more fine-grained differentiation in brackets based on a classification
proposed by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. First Past
The Post (FPTP) and Two-Round Systems (TRS) are two variants of majority systems. List
Proportional Representation (LPR) and Single Transferable Vote (STV) are variants of
proportional election systems. Finally, Mixed Member Proportional Systems (MMP) and
parallel systems combine majority and proportional systems, but are here counted as
proportional systems.18 Based on the crude dichotomous distinction, the table provides two
central results: (1) In Europe proportional systems are much more widespread than
majority systems. (2) These systems also tend to have higher rates of turnout (79% vs.
73%).19 A closer analysis of the two Western European countries with majority systems,
i.e. France and the United Kingdom, shows that this cannot fully explain the European-
American turnout gap. Despite their similar electoral systems, France and Britain have
widely discrepant turnout levels, and participation in France is much higher than in the
United States.
The competitiveness of the election is another potential determinant of turnout. If the
election result is believed to be narrow, the expected weight of the individual vote is
presumably perceived to be higher. To the extent that rational voters compare the costs and
benefits of voting, the expectation of a narrow election result should thus increase voter
turnout (Gray/Caul 2000, Jackman 1987; Kirchgässner 1990; Powell 1986; for a discrepant
assessment see also Ferejohn/Fiorina 1975). In Table 1 the competitiveness of the election
is measured by the absolute difference between the two strongest parties or candidates. The
smaller this difference, the closer should be the political battle. By this yardstick, election
results were very narrow in the most recent American presidential elections as well as in
some European elections. A simple bivariate linear regression analysis of the data shows
that the degree of competitiveness increases turnout within each country group. For the
Western European countries, every percentage point of increasing closeness boosts
turnout by 0.07 percentage points. For Eastern Europe the respective coefficient is 0.17
percentage points, and for the two Mediterranean countries it is even 0.76 percentage
points. The predicted turnout for a hypothetical Western European country with the
competitiveness level of the United States would be 78 per cent,20 which is much higher
than the observed American level of 56 per cent. Hence, taking the competitiveness of
elections into account would even increase the gap in voter turnout between Western
Europe and the U.S.
The last column in Table 1 shows how many parties obtained more than five per cent
of the votes in the national election. In a multi-party system, small parties are able to tailor
their policies to the demands of specific groups. Consequently, turnout should be higher
than in systems with only few parties which are less able to appeal to specific voter
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interests. Table 1 shows that the American political system is essentially a two-party
system, while Greece, Spain, Hungary, and Malta are the only European countries with two
party systems. The United Kingdom, Ireland, and France are similar in also having only
a limited number of parties. Analyzing the relationship between turnout and the number
of parties by means of bivariate regression shows that multi-party systems tend to have
higher turnout. In Western Europe, each additional party increases turnout by 2.8
percentage points, in the post-communist countries the respective increase amounts to 0.88
points. The predicted value for a Western European country with only two parties is 71 per
cent. Even though this is lower than the average turnout we actually observe, it is still 15
percentage points higher than the observed American level.
We conclude that none of the institutional factors regarded here can explain the
European-American turnout gap alone. The question then is if the ensemble of institutional
characteristics related to electoral procedures helps to understand differences in turnout.
There are two ways to analyze this problem. The first one is to compare the U.S. turnout
figure only to Western European countries that are institutionally very similar. A simple
way to find most similar countries is to count the number of arrangements that are different
from the U.S.21 Judged by this yardstick, the Western European countries which are most
similar to the U.S. are the United Kingdom, Ireland, and France. All three countries have
distinctly higher turnout than the United States, although Britain and Ireland stand out for
their comparative low levels of turnout within the old EU-15. Hence the result is
ambiguous, as some but not all of the observed turnout gap between Europe and America
can be related to differences in the institutional rules of the game.
A second way to trace the combined impact of institutional regulations is to use a linear
regression of turnout on all institutional characteristics to predict what turnout level a
Western European country would have if it had all the properties of the United States. A
hypothetical Western European country with the properties of the American electoral
system would have a turnout of 63 per cent. Even though this is much lower than the
observed Western European average of 78 per cent, it is still six percentage points higher
than the actually observed American level of 56 per cent.
To a certain extent, then, our analysis provides empirical support for Lipset’s assertion
that the low electoral turnout in America must be interpreted as a result of peculiar features
of the American electoral system which lower the incentive to go to the polls. However,
these institutional factors cannot account for the entire participation gap. In addition Lipset
assumed that institutional incentives impinge similarly upon all social groups. If all voters
are rational actors who similarly weigh the costs and benefits of electoral participation as
impinged by institutional impediments for registration on the one side or by the likely
impact of one’s vote given the closeness of the political competition on the other, we should
expect turnout to be roughly similar across all social strata. If, on the other hand, voter
turnout reflects the inclusiveness of the political system, we should expect American and
European turnout to be perhaps similar among the higher strata, but more different among
the lower strata whom we expect to be politically more integrated in Europe due to the more
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representative shape of the input side of the political process, and the more encompassing
and universal welfare state arrangements on the output side. From this perspective, we
would also expect a rather low degree of inequality in political participation in Europe, but
a high degree of polarization in America where welfare state schemes are less encompassing
and more bifurcated with more generous entitlements for the middle classes on the one side
and more stingy categorical entitlements for specific lower class groups on the other (Klass
1985; Glazer 1988), while political representation on the input side is more skewed in favor
of higher income strata. In short, we expect turnout among the higher strata to be similar
in Europe and America, while we expect the turnout of lower strata to be higher in the more
inclusive European welfare states. The following analysis of the social distribution of
voting and non-voting examine to what extent the data bear out these expectations.
3 The social inequality of electoral participation
Turnout rates may be low because all groups of a society abstain similarly from voting,
or because specific groups fail to participate. Our first empirical question thus is if the
European-American turnout gap is the same throughout all social groups or if it
systematically varies by social class. In other words, we ask which groups produce the
observed gap: Those at the bottom, at the top, or at the middle of the income and skill
distribution.
3.1 Voter turnout in different social groups
A comparison of the social stratification of voter turnout has to rely on surveys. These
surveys should fulfill a number of conditions. First, and most obviously, they must contain
reliable measures of electoral participation and of socio-economic position. Second, the
samples should cover at least the entire eligible population of each country; or, if more than
the eligible population is covered, there must be information which allows us to restrict
the analysis to potentially eligible voters. Finally, all data should be measured in
comparable ways throughout all countries under observation. Unfortunately, there is not
a single survey which meets all these conditions. The two international comparative survey
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programs which come close to meeting all standards - the International Social Survey
Programme (ISSP) and the Comparative Study of Elections Systems (CSES) - both have
only incomplete coverage of European countries. The only survey program with a complete
coverage of all EU member states is the “European Quality of Life Survey” (EQLS), which
does not include the United States. The European Social Survey (ESS) offers high quality
data for a broad, yet incomplete, set of European countries, and also fails to include the
United States. In all these survey programs non-voters are under-represented, either
because of a systematic under-coverage of non voters, or because social desirability
considerations affect the answering behavior.
Using averages of all available suitable surveys, Table 2 shows how turnout varies by
income and education (the number of surveys is given in brackets). The first three columns
give the percentage of voters in the lowest, middle, and highest income quintiles (based
on equivalent household income), and the columns 4-6 show the respective figures for
people at three different levels of education.
The overall result is that the higher social strata tend to participate very similarly in all
countries. The participation of the lower social strata varies widely, however, being much
higher in Europe than in America. With respect to income, turnout of those in the top
income quintile is 83 per cent in the U.S., compared to 88 per cent in Western Europe and
81 per cent in the post-communist countries. In the lowest income quintile only 55 per cent
go to the polls in America, while turnout in Europe stands at 79 percent in the EU-15 and
at 71 per cent in the Eastern new member states. The Czech Republic, Estonia, and Poland
are the only countries where the lower strata abstain from voting to a similar degree as in
the United States. The same pattern results with respect to education. Among those with
the highest educational degree the American turnout rate of 86 per cent is very similar to
the average turnout rate of highly educated people in Western Europe (88%) or in the ten
Eastern European new member states (86%). Vast differences appear among those with
little schooling. Whereas only 46 per cent of poorly educated Americans go to the polls,
the respective figures for their European peers are 81 per cent in Western Europe and 71
per cent in the transformation countries. The United States thus stand out for their
remarkably high inequality of electoral participation.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine what policy consequences result from
the differences in political participation in Europe and America. We must assume,
however, that the actual voters form - together with the masters of investment decisions
who can resort to the exit rather than the voice mechanism of political influence – the
relevant reference group for politicians who seek office or re-election. The fact that voting
is so much more socially skewed in America than in Europe means that the median voter
in European countries resides at a much lower point in the social structure than the median
voter in the United States. In order to rally half of the electorate behind them, European
politicians must thus dig much further down in the structure of social inequality than the
political elites in America. As Figure 2 shows, the income position of American voters is
higher than in any European country. If they want to win elections, European politicians
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must thus tailor their policies more to the concerns of lower strata than their American
counterparts who can afford to be more receptive to “the wishes of the more privileged,
participating, and organized strata” (as Lipset 1969: 216 put it in the line we quoted above).
The question then is why political participation is so much less skewed in Europe. In
the next two sections we investigate to what extent the more equal distribution of electoral
participation in Europe may be related to the higher inclusiveness of the European state(s).
Table 2: Turnout by social class (numbers represent average results of different surveys)
 Income Education 
 
No. of 
surveys 1st Quint. 2nd—4th 
Quint. 
5th  
Quint. 
Low Inter-
mediat 
High 
US 4 55 72 83 46 69 86 
        
AT 5 78 85 91 78 85 91 
BE 5 89 91 94 88 90 93 
DE 7 81 89 93 77 90 95 
DK 5 91 94 95 89 94 96 
ES 7 82 83 84 83 79 85 
FI 5 72 80 89 77 77 88 
FR 5 73 79 84 80 76 80 
GB 5 67 72 74 74 69 75 
GR 3 91 91 91 92 88 91 
IE 5 77 82 82 80 79 84 
IT 2 86 93 92 88 94 95 
LU 3 62 79 84 70 79 77 
NL 7 84 90 91 84 90 94 
PT 7 74 74 80 74 72 80 
SE 7 83 89 94 86 85 93 
EU-15  79 85 88 81 83 88 
        
CY 3 95 93 98 98 88 95 
MT 1 99 97 92 100 96 98 
Med. Periph  97 95 95 99 92 97 
        
BG 3 72 78 77 77 73 82 
CZ 7 58 68 71 57 67 82 
EE 2 56 68 78 54 63 78 
HU 7 73 81 87 74 86 94 
LT 1 84 87 84 85 84 92 
LV 3 73 77 83 64 75 89 
PL 7 57 66 71 57 70 78 
RO 1 91 89 88 92 89 89 
SI 5 75 81 84 75 78 85 
SK 4 74 84 83 74 83 88 
NMS-10  71 78 81 71 77 86 
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Sources: CSES I, CSES II, ISSP ’04, ISSP ’02, ESS ’02, ESS ’04, EQLS ’03
Figure 2: The average position of voters in the national income distribution
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3.2 The inequality of electoral participation and the inclusiveness of
the state
Based on Table 2 in the previous section, the dots in Figure 3 show the turnout gap which
separates higher and lower social strata (calculated as the simple difference in turnout).
In order to capture the variability of survey results, the figure also displays horizontal lines
showing how far the results of different surveys are apart. The longer these lines are, the
more insecurity there is in our knowledge of the degree of polarization in a given country.
The major finding of the previous section is clearly re-iterated, however: Turnout
inequality is higher in the United States than in any other country under observation. Judged
from data of four different surveys (ISSP 2002, ISSP 2004, CSES I, CSES II), electoral
participation in the highest American income quintile is between 35 and 22 percentage
points higher than in the lowest income quintile. For Western Europe the gap is less than
10 percentage points on average, and Finland is the only country for which we find at least
one survey that produces a gap of a magnitude similar to the United States.22 Even the
Eastern European countries which stood out for their comparatively low overall turnout
do not reach the American level of inequality in electoral participation.
If Lipset’s assumption that all segments of the population will react similarly to major
stimuli in cohesive and stable democratic systems is right (Lipset 1969: 33), the
remarkable social inequality in voting cannot be attributed to the impact of institutional
settings. Conceptually there is little reason to assume that institutional hurdles impinge
very differently on specific social groups, empirically there is no statistical association.
As the example of the Eastern European countries shows, low overall turnout need not
necessarily translate into high inequality of electoral behavior. Moreover, those Western
European countries which are institutionally most similar to the United States – France,
Ireland, and the United Kingdom – do not show a comparable level of turnout polarization.
In fact, these countries even show relatively small inequality of electoral participation. A
more formal statistical comparison of the degree of polarization in America and Western
Europe also reveals the extraordinarily high degree of inequality in America. If we insert
a hypothetical country with the same institutional characteristics as the United States into
the regression for Western European nations, we statistically predict a gap of 9.5
percentage points, whereas the actually observed difference in the United States is 33
points.23 Hence, institutional features of the election system may travel a certain distance
in explaining cross-national differences in overall turnout, but they cannot explain why
turnout is so much more unequal in the United States than in Europe.
Proponents of the European social model would relate the differences to the greater
inclusiveness of the state in Europe. In order to test this hypothesis, we have compiled some
indicators which tap state characteristics on the output side of the political process. These
indicators are presented in Table 3, together with a summary measure of the degree of
inequality expressed as the average of the two results for income and education differentials.
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For the input side, for which there are few comparable data we can only trace if political
parties get direct or indirect state support for the funding of election campaigns.24 For the
output side we have used two indicators which capture the scope of the tax and welfare state:
a) total tax revenues expressed as a percentage of GDP, b) the social expenditure ratio,
expressed in gross and net terms (Adema and Ladaique 2005).25 The more public funding
there is for elections, the less effective campaigning is confined to candidates or parties
who can mobilize huge sums of private money, and the more widespread appeal there
probably is to voters from all social strata. On the output side, we would expect more
universal welfare states - which have more encompassing social programs that provide
benefits to all citizens free of stigma - to appeal to all social strata similarly. Even though
Figure 3: The inequality of electoral participation in the dimensions of income and education
Sources: CSES I, CSES II, ISSP ’04, ISSP ’02, ESS ’02, ESS ’04, EQLS ’03
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only a very crude measure, the gross social expenditure ratio is used here as a proxy for
more inclusive welfare states. The effect of the net social expenditure ratio, which also
includes occupational welfare programs and tax subsidies, should be less straightforward,
because the benefits thus defined are distributed less equally or come as categorical
entitlements with a stigma and thus incorporate the lower classes less effectively into the
political order.
Table 3: Overall polarization and indicators for inclusiveness
 Electoral 
polarization 
Social 
expenditure 
(gross) as % of 
GDP  
Social 
expenditure 
(net) as % of  
GDP  
Total tax 
revenue as % 
of GDP       
US 34 15 23 26 
     
GR -1 25  35 
ES 3 20 17 35 
GB 4 24 23 36 
FR 5 30 27 43 
BE 5 27 23 45 
IE 5 15 12 30 
PT 6 23  34 
IT 6 25 22 41 
DK 6 30 22 49 
SE 9 31 26 50 
NL 9 25 22 38 
LU 12 22  38 
AT 13 28 22 43 
FI 14 26 20 44 
DE 15 28 28 35 
EU-15 7.4 25 22 40 
     
MT -4 19   
CY 0 18   
Med. Periph. -2 19   
     
RO -3    
LT 3 13   
BG 5    
SI 9 24   
SK 11 18 17 30 
HU 17 20  38 
PL 18 22  34 
LV 18 13   
CZ 19 20 18 38 
EE 23 13   
NMS 10 12 18 18 35 
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With respect to campaign financing, the U.S. stands out as a country which limits its
scarce public funding to presidential elections.26 It is also the country with the highest
degree of electoral inequality. Further cross-national analysis is impeded by the fact that
all European countries have varieties of more or less generous public funding, but more
precise comparative information on the quantity of public funding is lacking.
Statistical comparisons with respect to the output side of state action are possible,
because social expenditure ratios do show considerable cross-national variation. The
American gross social expenditure ratio of 15 per cent compares to an average of 25 per
cent in Western Europe and to a mean slightly below 20 per cent in the transformation
countries. In this sense the higher degree of polarization may be related to different scopes
of welfare arrangements. However, there is also considerable variation within Europe.
Figure 4 presents an analysis of the association between social expenditure ratios and the
inequality in turnout. Country groups are plotted with different marker symbols in the
scatter plots of the figure, and a non-parametric regression line27 illustrates the relationship
between the two variables for each group. The result is that there is hardly any statistical
association. In Western Europe, electoral inequality stays more or less the same regardless
of the level of gross social expenditure. In Eastern Europe there is some indication for a
higher polarization in countries with less developed welfare states. However, the degree
of electoral inequality is much lower in these countries than in the US despite the fact that
some of them have similarly low levels of social spending.
 Practically the same finding results if we measure the scope of state action by the
revenue share in GDP. While the United States does have a lower revenue ratio than any
European country for which we have data, there is considerable variation within Europe
which is not associated with the degree of inequality in electoral participation. The other
two indicators for inclusiveness – the net social expenditure ratio and the pension
expenditure ratio – neither show the U.S. to have exceptional values, nor do these measures
correlate with the inequality of electoral participation within country groups.
With respect to the majority of the indicators shown in Table 3, the United States appears
as having a less encompassing state than European countries. As long as we lack a European
country with similarly low scope of state action, however, we cannot really test whether
it is the inclusiveness of the state that produces the patterns in electoral participation, or
rather some other factor. If we put both indicators of the scope of state activities - i.e. the
gross expenditure ratio and the revenue share - together into a multiple regression, the
American pattern of electoral behavior is not explained by the data. A hypothetical Western
European country with as limited a welfare state as the U.S. would have a statistically
predicted turnout inequality of 3.7 percentage points, while the observed American gap
is actually 34 percentage points.
The macro-comparisons based on crude indicators of state action thus fail to provide
convincing evidence for the hypothesis that universal welfare state programs and a more
inclusive state foster the political integration of all citizens. However, there is also a
possibility to test the hypothesis with reference to micro-comparisons of various groups
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of respondents within countries. If encompassing welfare states are more politically
inclusive thus leading to a lower degree of turnout inequality, we would expect European-
American differences to vanish among population groups for which the welfare state
arrangements on both sides of the Atlantic are rather similar.
Figure 4: The inequality of electoral participation in countries with different scopes of state
action
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3.3 The inequality of electoral participation among pensioners
The United States have an encompassing social security scheme providing similarly
universal and fairly generous benefits as European pension schemes in old age, as well as
a Medicare scheme providing public health to the pensioner generation. Hence we should
expect the population above retirement age in America to display a much less socially
skewed pattern of electoral participation and to become more similar to their European
peers than the younger generation.28 In Europe, in contrast, we would not expect the degree
of electoral polarization to vary sizably between age groups as all age-cohorts are similarly
incorporated into welfare state schemes.
Figure 5 compares the turnout inequality within the pensioner generation - i.e.
respondents who are 65 and older - to the turnout of people at prime working age 30-64
(excluding the group of youngest voters who generally stand out for their low turnout). The
dots show the level of inequality for the younger age group, while the arrows point to the
electoral polarization among the elderly.
It results that the degree of electoral inequality is much smaller for pensioners in the
U.S., whereas older and younger cohorts in Europe do not differ much in their degrees of
polarization. Concerning the inequality with respect to education there are only three
European countries – Austria, Germany and Latvia – that approximate the American
pattern. Concerning the polarization with respect to income, only four other countries –
France, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Czech Republic – display a similar tendency as the U.S.
Hence, the United States is the only country for which we consistently find lower turnout
inequality in the pensioner generation than in the working-age generation, regardless of
which dimension of social inequality is examined. This also implies that the degree of
electoral inequality among old Americans is much more similar to Western European
standards than among the young who are not similarly attached to universal welfare
programs in America. The differences between Europe and America do not vanish
completely among the elderly population. Yet a difference of 42 percentage points among
the younger age groups is reduced to a gap of merely 25 points in the pensioner generation
who are similarly incorporated into welfare state schemes as their peers on the other side
of the Atlantic. This sustains our impression that more inclusive state institutions foster
political integration with more widespread and less socially skewed electoral participation.
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Figure 5: Turnout inequality in the pensioner generation and the younger generation
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4 The meaning of non-voting
Voting can only be interpreted as an indication of successful political integration if it can
be demonstrated that non-voters are politically more alienated than voters, and that non-
voters also resort less frequently to other forms of political participation so that abstention
from the act of voting is not compensated by other and perhaps even more engaging forms
of political action. Hence we will examine a) if voting is associated with political
satisfaction or rather coupled with dissatisfaction, and b) to what degree voting goes
together with or is an alternative to other forms of political engagement.
To what extent can non-voting be interpreted as a sign of satisfaction with the political
status quo which induces people to indulge in more interesting things than voting? On the
macro-level, we find that low rates of electoral turnout are not a typical characteristic of
more affluent nations. In Europe, turnout is high in rich countries like Denmark, Sweden,
or the Netherlands, but relatively low in the poorer countries of Central Eastern Europe
and of southern Europe. On the individual level, we can examine more directly if political
satisfaction breeds voting or abstention from the polls. Based on data from the two CSES
modules, the ESS of the years 2002 and 2004, and the ISSP of 2004, Figure 6 shows the
difference in electoral participation of people who are politically satisfied with the way
democracy works in their country and those who are not,29 controlling for gender, age,
household income and employment status. The result of this analysis is that politically
satisfied citizens are more likely to go to the polls than those who are dissatisfied. Hence
it is not true that satisfied people have more interesting things to do than indulge in politics.
By participating in elections, politically satisfied people apparently express their loyalty
to the prevailing political order, while more alienated people abstain from voting. This
sustains our notion that high turnout may be interpreted as a sign of successful political
integration.
The question then is to what extent non-voting is compensated by other forms of lawful
political action. Figure 7 shows the proportion of respondents who had contacted a
politician in the last year, who worked together with other people in an activity group, or
who participated in a protest march or demonstration in the previous year. Two results
stand out. First, Americans contact politicians more frequently than Europeans and while
shying away from participation in a protest march they are also more likely to work together
with other people in activity groups.30 A closer look reveals, however, that these alternative
forms of participation are distributed just as unequally as the act of voting. Rich and better
educated citizens contact politicians more frequently, they also engage in activity groups
more often, and they even are more likely take part in demonstrations than poor or lower
educated people. Analyses not shown here for reasons of space reveal that the inequality
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of these alternative forms of political participation is higher in the US than in European
countries. The crucial finding from our perspective is, however, that non-voters use
alternative forms of political behaviour less frequently than voters.
Figure 6: The difference in turnout of politically satisfied and dissatisfied groups
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Figure 8 shows to what extent the fraction of political activists among voters differs from
the fraction of participants among non-voters. It reveals that in practically all countries
voters engage more frequently in other forms of political action than non-voters.
Obviously, different forms of political participation feed on each other rather than serving
as substitutes. However, also the other forms of political participation are more socially
skewed in America than in Europe. Hence the high inequality in political involvement in
America is not confined to the act of voting but extends to other forms of engagement as
well. In this sense, inequalities of political participation reinforce rather than compensate
each other in the United States.
Figure 7: Participation rates in alternative forms of political action
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Sources: CSES I, CSES II, ESS ’02, ESS ’04, EQLS ’03, ISSP ’04
Figure 8: Participation in alternative forms of political action among voters and non-voters
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5 Conclusions
We have shown that electoral turnout is higher and less socially skewed in Western Europe
than in America. The differences in the levels of turnout can partly be related to differences
in election procedures, but since election procedures provide similar incentives or
disincentives to all social groups they cannot explain the much higher inequality of
electoral participation in America. There is some evidence to sustain the notion that the
higher inclusiveness of the (Western) European State(s) fosters political integration and
the equality of electoral participation. In line with this notion differences between Europe
and America diminish considerably when the analysis is confined to the pensioner
generation whose integration into welfare state schemes is largely similar on both sides
of the Atlantic.
In many respects, the new member states of the European Union stand at the crossroads
between those two poles. While the level of turnout is rather low and has been shrinking
in recent years, the inequality of electoral participation is still much lower than in the
United States. It is up to national policy makers to decide which of the two rather distinct
models of political participation in democracies they find more appealing for their
countries. They should be aware of the political implications of their choices, however.
If the aim is to foster widespread political participation and to give citizens across all social
strata similar weight in the political process, then there are reasons to follow the Western
European rather than the American variety of democracy.
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Notes
1 For more recent synthetic literature building on Lipset’s pioneering work see Lijphart (1997);
Wilensky (2002, chapter 11 and 18); Verba (2003).
2 Condensing various arguments found in Lipset’s work (especially Lipset 1960 and Lipset 1996),
the following account gives a stylized summary of the “American exceptionalism” school of
thinking which basically started with Sombart’s (1906) book on “Why is there no socialism in the
United States” and Wells’ book on “The Future in America” (1906) of the same year. Lipset himself
would not have necessarily subscribed to our stylized account of his position as he usually weighed
arguments and counter-arguments in a complex and differentiated fashion frequently referring to
alternative hypotheses.
3 Another factor worth noting is that in America some two million citizens over eighteen who are in
prisons or who are ex-convicts are disqualified from voting (Shipler 2004: 287). The American
prison population in federal or state prisons increased from 0.3 million in 1980 to 1.4 million in
2004. This number does not include prisoners in local jails whose number increased from 182,000
to 714,000. The size of the total population in prison, jail, on probation, or on parole increased
from 1.8 million to 7 million by 2004 (U.S. Census Bureau 2007: 209).
4 As far as we know, there is no publication which explicitly relates the idea of a European social
model to particular features of electoral turnout. Rather we have “constructed” this interpretation
here quasi as the incarnation of “the European dream” (Rifkin 2004) which has perhaps found its
most explicit expression in indirect form in the negative mirror image which Piven and Cloward
(1988; 2000) described with reference to the American political system.
5 For empirically based qualifications of this view comparing the policy orientations of voters and
nonvoters see Shaffer (1982) and Bennett and Resnick (1990). Both studies found the differences
to be not very big even though the latter research showed nonvoters to be more in favor of spending
on welfare programs; see also Leighly and Nagler (2007) for the rather limited effects of de-
unionisation on turnout decline.
6 Comparative data on the social structure of European parliaments in historical perspective are
given in Best and Cotta (2000) and Best (2007). Neither of these sources reports the income of
parliamentarians, while both highlight the growing over-representation of university graduates
in the post-war period. In the American Congress at least one third of all Senate members were
millionaires in 1997, whereas the number of millionaires in the House amounted to over 60
(Davidson/Oleszek 1998: 210). An Internet source gives the percentages of millionaires for 2003
as 40 % for the Senate, and 28 % for the House (http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/06/13/
senators.finances/); this compared to a stated proportion of millionaires in the population of 1 %
(http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0630-05.htm). This high over-representation of
affluent groups in the American Congress is related to the very high cost of election campaigns.
In the election cycle 2003-04 the average cost of wining a seat in the Senate was reported as 2.6
mio dollars, while the average for a seat in the House was 531.000 dollars (Davidson/Oleszek
2006: 67).
7 For an elaboration see Alber (2000), McDonald and Popkin (2001).
8 We have used the most recent “first order” election of each country for which IDEA provides
data, i.e. the election which is perceived as the key nation-wide election by the voters.
9 Basing international comparisons of electoral statistics on the number of votes expressed as a
percentage of the eligible population does not completely eliminate all pitfalls in comparisons,
because countries may differ in their liberalism with respect to granting the rights of citizenship.
Thus countries which restrict citizenship rights – for example by barring prisoners, ex-convicts
or the resident alien population from voting – make the denominator of the fraction smaller than
countries which grant rights more generously.
10 Country group averages were calculated by summing up the turnout rates of each country of the
country group and dividing by the number of countries without weighting for population size.
11 Following the convention of ISO 3188, we use the abbreviation “GB” for the United Kingdom in
our tables and graphs.
12 While Table 1 reports average national turnout during the last three elections, the following
discussion of the impact of institutional factors refers to the specific institutional setting
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characterizing each respective election taking all three national elections into account.
13 The extent to which weekday elections actually increase the cost of voting hinges very much
upon the opening hours of the ballot boxes.
14 A number of countries, primarily in Eastern Europe, hold their elections on two consecutive days.
These elections were classified as weekend elections, if one of these days was a Saturday or
Sunday.
15 In these countries turnout was higher in the presidential elections than in elections of the parliament
which sustains our notion that the former constitute first order elections.
16 Austria, which has compulsory voting in only two of its states (Vorarlberg and Tirol) was here
classified as a country without compulsory voting.
17 For countries without compulsory registration, it is not entirely clear if turnout rates are based on
all eligible voters in the denominator or only on the number of registered voters.
18 Detailed descriptions of these various electoral systems may be found on the IDEA web site under
http://www.idea.int/esd/glossary.cfm.
19 Based on an analysis of 147 elections, this result has also been demonstrated by the International
Institute for Democracies and Electoral Assistance (http://www.idea.int/vt/survey/
voter_turnout8.cfm).
20 This value results if the average American competitiveness score of 3.47 is entered into the
regression equation for Western European countries.
21 Differences in competitiveness and the number of parties were weighted so that the highest observed
difference amounted to one, while smaller observed differences were expressed as fractions of
this maximum difference.
22 This refers to the results of the ISSP 2004 (23 percentage points). The values of the other surveys
are: 19 (EQLS), 16 (ISSP 2002), 15 (ESS 2002) and 12 (ESS 2004).
23 This refers to the average gap in both dimensions of social inequaliy resulting from all considered
surveys.
24 http://www.aceproject.org/epic-en/pc.
25 For the European OECD countries, the data listed in the table report the average value of the gross
social expenditure ratio for the years 2001 (Adema and Ladaique 2005) and 2004 (http://
epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/). For the U.S. we have only used data for 2001 and for the European
non OECD members we rely on the source for 2004.
26 The 1974 amendment to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) introduced the option of full
public financing for presidential general election campaigns in return for an acceptance of certain
regulations including spending caps, but this option proved to be increasingly unattractive to the
candidates. In the 2004 campaign financial activities of Presidential candidates totaled more than
$ 1 billion, whereas federal matching funds amounted to $ 28 million thus covering merely 4 % of
the total cost of primaries. The two major party nominees received $ 74.6 million each in public
funds to conduct their general election, while the two parties received $ 14.9 million each from
the U.S treasury for their nominating conventions (see the section on campaign finance statistics
in Federal Election Commission 2005b: 63). Historical accounts of the decreasing role of public
funding in the financing of presidential campaigns are given in Corrado 2005a and Corrado 2005b.
In the 2008 election all major candidates refused federal matching funds for the primaries, while
Senator Barack Obama became the first candidate to refuse government funds for the general
election.
27 Non parametric regression can be used to explore the relationship between two variables without
making assumptions on the functional form of the relationship. Several techniques for non
parametric regression analysis exist. The technique we have used is Cleveland’s (1979) “locally
weighted scatterplot smoother” (LOWESS).
28 This is in line with recent research by Andrea Louise Campbell (2002; 2003) investigating the
mobilizing effects of social security and showing that those who are more dependent upon public
programs are more active.
29 The wording of the question varies between surveys. The ESS and CESES surveys asked how
satisfied the respondents were with the way democracy works in their country, while the 2004
ISSP asked how the respondents think democracy works in their country. In Figure 6 we have
therefore separated the results of the ISSP from the two other surveys.
30 These figures are sensitive to the different wording of the respective question in various surveys.
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